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RATIONALITY’S REACH
Adam B. Badawi*
Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets. By Oren Bar-Gill. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012.
Pp. xvi, 249. Cloth, $39; paper, $25.

Introduction
Economic analysis and the rational actor model have dominated contracts scholarship for at least a generation.1 In the past fifteen years or so,
however, a group of behaviorists has challenged the ability of the rational
choice model to account for consumer behavior.2 These behaviorists are not
trying to dismantle the entire enterprise. They generally accept the fundamentals of economic analysis but argue that the rational actor model can be
improved by incorporating evidence of decisionmaking flaws that people
exhibit.
Oren Bar-Gill3 has been one of the foremost and influential proponents
of a behaviorist take on contracts, and his recent book, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets, is the culmination of these efforts. In the book, he portrays consumers as the targets of
temptation. The tempters are credit card, subprime mortgage, and cell
phone companies that structure contracts in ways that exploit the behavioral
weaknesses of some consumers. They seduce by offering upfront lures like
frequent-flier miles, interest-only payments, and ostensibly free cell phones.
But these contracts also bury deferred penalties such as escalating interest
rates and a bevy of fees. The later costs are a source of regret for consumers
and, in Bar-Gill’s view, may warrant regulation that can limit this undesirable seduction.
Bar-Gill builds his analysis around a framework that emphasizes the
problems with contractual complexity and deferred costs. Complexity can
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis Law School. I thank
Scott Baker and Oren Bar-Gill for helpful comments. Eric Dolenti provided outstanding
research assistance.
1. See Eric A. Posner, Essay, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 Yale L.J. 829, 829 (2003) (“Modern economic analysis of contract law
began about thirty years ago and, many scholars would agree, has become the dominant academic style of contract theory.”).
2. For some early efforts, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1505–08 (1998), which conducts a behavioral analysis of
mandatory contract terms, and Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (2003).
3. Evelyn and Harold Meltzer Professor of Law and Economics, New York University
School of Law.
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obscure the content of contracts, and consumers may be overly optimistic
about what they do not know. This effect, Bar-Gill argues, can lead people to
make errors when they assess the value of a bargain (p. 10). Deferred costs,
meanwhile, exploit the intense preference that some consumers may have for
immediate gratification (pp. 21–23). This myopia leads them to underestimate whether and how often they will fall prey to the deferred fees that
many consumer contracts impose.
Throughout the book, Bar-Gill recommends the same salve for both ills.
Targeted disclosure, he argues, is a minimally intrusive way to improve consumer-purchasing decisions (pp. 32–43). It can correct optimism by alerting
people to the cost of terms that may be buried in contracts, and it can minimize myopia by informing people about typical usage patterns.
In this Review, I contrast Bar-Gill’s analysis of complexity and deferred
costs with an analysis of these problems that uses a pure rational choice
model. My goal is to evaluate which of these approaches fares better at explaining the necessarily limited evidence we have about consumer responses
to contractual complexity and deferred costs. As will become clear, I think
that what we learn from the behavioral take on myopia tells us more than
would a behavioral perspective on contractual complexity. When it comes to
dense and complex fine print, there are longstanding rational choice models
that predict how people might respond to the high cost of learning what is
in a contract. These models predict that people will not read consumer
agreements and that contract quality will accordingly be low. I suggest that
the problem of rational ignorance of contracts may be a more substantial
problem than the misperception that Bar-Gill stresses.
As part of this exercise, I explain my skepticism that the improved disclosure Bar-Gill endorses will be the most effective way to regulate the
problems he identifies with consumer contracts.4 With regard to complexity,
this skepticism comes from an argument that the rational choice model may
best explain how consumers evaluate form contracts. These models of complexity predict that the failure of consumers to read contracts will substantially degrade the overall quality of contracts. If these models are correct,
disclosing that low quality will not do much good.5 The real culprit here is
4. I am not alone in questioning how effective disclosure will be at improving consumer
outcomes. Bar-Gill’s occasional coauthor, Omri Ben-Shahar, has written a series of articles
and a book with Carl Schneider on the pathologies of disclosure. While Bar-Gill cites this work
in passing (p. 33), his case for disclosure would be improved by engaging the Ben-Shahar and
Schneider critique in a more substantial way. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider,
More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (forthcoming
2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 647, 665 (2011) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar & Schneider, Failure of Mandated Disclosure]
(arguing that mandatory disclosure does not achieve its purported end goal of improving the
decisions of consumers); see also Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and
Restaurant Grading, 122 Yale L.J. 574 (2012) (showing that even simple disclosures like restaurant grades can be inaccurate and subject to manipulation).
5. This argument depends on whether consumers make rational assumptions when
they do not know the content of contracts. If they are optimistic or they misperceive the terms
of an agreement, as Bar-Gill argues, and disclosure effectively corrects these beliefs, disclosure
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the high cost of learning contract terms. After a review of some proposals
that follow from the rational choice model,6 I include my own counterintuitive suggestion that making default rules more seller friendly may be a desirable way to improve outcomes.
When it comes to deferred costs and myopia, Bar-Gill has me convinced
that these mistakes occur and that they may have a deleterious effect on
welfare. I am not sure, however, how effective disclosure will be as a remedy.
This problem is ultimately one of weakness of the will. Consumers know the
high costs of making late payments or exceeding their allotted cell phone
minutes, but they incorrectly believe that they will be able to exercise
enough discipline to avoid these penalties. Given that consumers are able to
deceive themselves into thinking that they will behave, I am not necessarily
persuaded that telling them that they are likely to misbehave will have much
of an effect. Stronger medicine may be necessary to change outcomes.
Before explaining my critiques in more detail, I should emphasize that
my goal here is to bring some measured skepticism to parts of the book
rather than to refute it in a fundamental way. Bar-Gill stands as one of the
handful of distinguished scholars who has forced practitioners of law and
economics to take behavioral concerns seriously. The methodical and thorough approach in this book shows why this is the case. Bar-Gill’s analysis
explores the predictions of the rational actor model and explains how they
may fail to account for observed behavior in the consumer markets that he
studies. He then assesses whether market-oriented solutions will likely be
able to solve the problem, and, where he concludes that they will not, he
advocates targeted interventions that may correct for the potential problems
that behavioral biases pose. These are hard questions about issues that lack
good data. While I disagree with Bar-Gill on some points, his book is likely
to remain an important resource for those who want general insight into the
application of behavioral concerns to contracts and for those who want a
deep understanding of the credit card, mortgage, and cell phone markets
that the book covers.
The remainder of this Review explores contractual complexity and deferred costs in separate Parts. In each, I briefly review Bar-Gill’s arguments
and evidence. I then evaluate those arguments against what a straightforward rational choice model would predict. I end each Part with thoughts
about what sorts of remedies may be more effective than disclosure.

may be able to change contract markets in a way that improves their terms. Pp. 2–5. As one
example, if mortgage contracts can succinctly disclose the complex and long-term costs associated with the agreement, the incentive to impose complex and long-term fees may dissipate. P.
176.
6. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and
the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215 (1990); Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form Contracts, 167 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 30 (2011).
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I. Contractual Complexity
Bar-Gill begins Seduction by Contract with a chapter that introduces the
methodological tools and assumptions that he will apply throughout his
analysis. In his framework, there is a difference between the actual terms of a
contract and the perceived terms of a contract (p. 9). The salience of contract terms, he argues, drives the difference between actual terms and perceived terms. If the terms of the contract are salient—that is, they stand out
to consumers who properly understand and value those terms—the difference between the actual and perceived terms will be minimal (p. 18). But if
the terms are not salient—meaning that they are not prominent and may be
difficult to value—the difference between the actual value of the contract
terms and the perceived value of the contract terms will be large (p. 25).
A core argument for Bar-Gill is that firms have an incentive to design
contracts in a way that increases the wedge between the actual value and the
perceived value of the contracts’ terms.7 He argues that firms can draft complex contractual language to make it difficult for consumers to perceive the
value of those terms. A rational consumer will infer that the clauses that
firms have packed into fine print are likely to favor the seller. Bar-Gill, however, argues that some consumers are irrational. As he puts it, “[I]mperfectly
rational consumers will completely ignore the unread or forgotten terms or
naively assume that they are favorable” (p. 21).
If consumers miscalculate the value of these terms, it can lead to overconsumption. Bar-Gill cites the complex rules that credit card companies
sometimes use as an example.8 He also marshals some evidence that consumers have difficulty understanding these terms and that this misunderstanding may lead them to price these terms incorrectly.9 As a consequence,
consumers may take on more credit than they should. The behavioral flaw
is, in essence, that of consumers being irrationally optimistic about what
they do not know.10 As his technical appendix to the first chapter helpfully
shows, those who are optimistic about the terms of contracts will enter into
more contracts than is optimal.11 This effect creates a welfare loss.12
7. E.g., pp. 10, 19, 21. Critics of behavioral law and economics commonly complain that
competition should be able to minimize the fallout from biased decisionmaking. At the very
least, they assert, competitive markets should fare better than regulated ones. See, e.g., Joshua
D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and
Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1033 (2012) (arguing that behavioral economics is
“libertarian paternalism” that poses a threat to both welfare and liberty).
8. Pp. 66–68 (explaining double-cycle billing and the practice of allocating payments to
low-interest balances first).
9. Pp. 79–81 (reviewing studies that show that consumers may not understand the fine
print in credit card agreements).
10. Bar-Gill says consumers may ignore the unread terms, p. 21, but I am unsure what
this means. To make a purchase decision, a consumer must have some belief about the value of
unknown terms in the contract.
11. See pp. 44–50.
12. See pp. 23–26.

April 2014]

Rationality’s Reach

997

Bar-Gill contrasts these behavioral costs with a rational choice account
of complex contract terms. But I am not sure that he chooses the right target
here. Rather than compare the welfare losses associated with rational choice
models of unknown contract terms, he asks a different set of questions. He
analyzes whether there could be any welfare-enhancing explanation for the
terms that firms bury in the fine print. Unsurprisingly, he finds that doublecycle billing by credit card companies, balloon payments in mortgages, and
cell phone penalties are unlikely to add value to contracts.13
This comparison asks what a fully informed consumer would think of
terms that firms put in complex contracts. The problems created by complexity, however, derive from how consumers will respond to misperceiving
or not knowing the terms of contracts. It is this difficulty that creates the
welfare loss. The equivalent question under a rational choice framework
would ask not how a fully informed consumer would price terms but how
an incompletely informed consumer would ascertain the value of a contract
and how firms would likely respond to that understanding.14
Contrasting the behavioral costs of complexity with a rational choice
account of how consumers understand and value contracts poses a harder
set of questions. These models predict significant welfare losses, and I suspect that these losses may be more substantial than those created by optimism about complexity. To see why, it is helpful to begin by explaining the
reading-cost analysis developed by Avery Katz. This is a pure rational choice
model that expects contracts between firms and consumers to be suboptimal.15 This model has been highly influential, and contract theorists continue to debate and refine the questions the model poses.16
13. Pp. 75–78 (credit card fees); pp. 146–56 (mortgage fees); pp. 227–29 (cell phone
contract complexity).
14. One might argue that there is a difference between disclosed contractual complexity
and fine print. For example, disclosed complexity could refer to information that consumers
attempt to understand but misperceive, while fine print could refer to the terms that consumers ignore. Bar-Gill’s book draws this distinction, p. 1, and argues that his disclosure regime
can minimize the harm from misperception. But one could also frame the issues as similar
because both misunderstood and unknown terms affect how consumers place a value on the
terms of a contract that they do not know with precision. Whether these two approaches could
be united is beyond the scope of this Review, but in the analysis that follows, I examine
whether the misperception problem is likely to be larger or smaller than the rational-ignorance
problem when it comes to how consumers value contracts.
15. See Katz, supra note 6, at 294–95 (arguing that, under a strict duty to read, an offeree
will not have sufficient incentive to read a form contract and that legal rules could increase
bargaining efficiency by limiting the drafting party’s freedom to vary the terms of form contracts); Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 21
RAND J. Econ. 518, 518 (1990) [hereinafter Katz, Your Terms or Mine?] (arguing that the
traditional rule, binding one who accepts a form contract to unread fine print, is “inferior to a
rule providing presumptive warranties when negotiation is costly”).
16. See, e.g., Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 31–32, 36, 41–42 (citing Katz, Your Terms or
Mine?, supra note 15). Bar-Gill does not incorporate the rational choice models of reading
costs into his analysis. But, to be fair, he does recognize that one can rationally ignore fine
print. See pp. 20–21 (noting that rational consumers may not read contracts and will “recognize that unread provisions will generally be pro-seller”).
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The Katz model asks how firms are likely to structure form contracts if
they know that consumers face positive reading costs and that the prevailing
rule requires that consumers assume the risk of not reading.17 The answer to
this question is quite elegant, if a bit dispiriting. If consumers read contracts,
firms would draft terms that would make a consumer nearly indifferent to
the choice between entering into a contract and not entering into it.18 But
consumers will not read contracts because they know that they will have to
sink the cost of reading them in return for contracts that do not make them
better off.19 When firms deduce that consumers will not read contracts at all,
they will provide even worse contracts than the ones that would make consumers who read indifferent. In this situation, firms know that they compete
only on price, and they obtain the lowest prices by dropping quality of terms
as much as possible. In equilibrium, no consumers read contracts, and the
contracts contain the lowest-quality terms that the law allows.20
The welfare losses from these dynamics of the Katz model are potentially very large. In an ideal world of no reading costs, consumers would be
perfectly informed. But as a consequence of the structure of form contracts
and the reading costs they impose, consumers do not know the content of
contracts. Firms respond by decreasing the quality of those terms to minimal levels.21 This means that there are likely to be higher-quality contract
terms that consumers would be willing to pay for, but reading costs stand in
the way of parties striking these bargains.
A. Comparing the Rational and Behavioral Models of Complexity
To know whether we should prioritize the rational or the behavioral
model of fine print, we need to know the magnitude of the welfare losses
associated with each approach. This Section analyzes what the theory and
evidence associated with each model say about the likely welfare effects.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to be clear about the different nature of the welfare losses under the behavioral and rational models.
17. Katz analyzes outcomes under one rule that places a duty to read on consumers and
under another rule that places a duty to speak on firms. Given a sufficiently high cost of
speaking, he finds that both rules will produce an equilibrium where firms offer contracts with
minimal quality.
18. Katz, supra note 6, at 288–89.
19. Id. at 289.
20. There have been several recent refinements to the Katz model. Albert Choi and YeonKoo Che evaluate the effect on form contracts when some consumers have low reading costs
and some have high reading costs. In this model, some firms will offer high-quality contracts.
Yeon-Koo Che & Albert H. Choi, Shrink Wraps: Who Should Bear the Cost of Communicating
Mass-Market Contract Terms? 13–14 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series No. 2009-15, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1384682.
Wickelgren argues that, as long as firms have the power to increase the length of contracts, and
thus increase readings costs, the equilibrium of the Katz model will remain the result. See
Wickelgren, supra note 6.
21. See Katz, supra note 6, at 288 (“[P]roviding any quality above the minimum possible
level is not a rational strategy for sellers . . . .”).

April 2014]

Rationality’s Reach

999

Bar-Gill asserts that both the difficulty of evaluating multiple price dimensions and optimism about unknown terms lead to overconsumption by irrational consumers (p. 164). These people pay more than they would if they
were correctly informed. The losses anticipated by the rational choice model
come from the inability to communicate (pp. 13–14). There is no overconsumption in this case because consumers understand that contracts contain
the low-quality terms. The welfare loss comes instead from the inability of
firms to provide higher-quality contracts that would make both firms and
consumers better off.22 These losses are not incompatible; there can simultaneously be overconsumption from optimism and forgone contracts due to
reading costs. But both problems stem from how much consumers are willing to pay for unknown or costly-to-understand terms. A comparison of
these models helps one understand where regulatory priorities should lie.
At a theoretical level, there is a strong reason to believe that the Katz
model suggests larger problems than a behavioral approach. The scale of the
rational choice analysis encompasses all consumers and all firms. Consumers and firms’ collective inability to communicate means that they lose the
chance to reach agreement on welfare-enhancing terms. The behavioral
model, however, identifies a problem that only applies to a subset of consumers—those who overestimate how favorable some contracts’ terms may
be (p. 12).
This difference in the affected populations does not necessarily mean
that the magnitude of the problem that reading costs cause is larger than
that created by incorrect optimism. It could be that reading costs result in
relatively few missed bargains: perhaps the average customer would not be
willing to pay for more favorable dispute resolution clauses or for enhanced
warranties. Alternatively, the degree of optimism that some consumers exhibit may be so large that they enter into contracts that make them far worse
off. Nevertheless, the bare fact that the rational choice model creates acrossthe-board losses suggests that reading costs might be a more effective target
of regulation than optimism.
It would be ideal, of course, if it were possible to estimate welfare losses
associated with consumer optimism and reading costs.23 But gauging these
costs empirically would likely pose daunting challenges. Take optimism
costs. Knowing whether some of the consumers who have entered into a
class of contracts are actually optimistic is a methodologically thorny task.
Consumers can be optimistic, they can be correct, or they can be pessimistic.
And to make things more complicated, a single consumer can be optimistic
22. See id. at 291–92 (suggesting that efficiency might be improved by providing implied
warranties and refusing to enforce some of the low-quality terms that stem from the cost of
communication).
23. Bar-Gill presents some evidence that attempts to ascertain the cost of consumer mistakes. His review of studies on subprime mortgages is, perhaps, the most thorough. See pp.
160–64 (reviewing studies that document that cognitive deficiencies may lead consumers to
make costly mistakes). But these studies do not tie the problem directly to optimism about the
content of complex contracts.
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about some terms, correct about others, and pessimistic about yet more
terms, all within the same contract.
Imagine a contract between a firm and a consumer that contains the
following dispute resolution terms: (1) all disputes will be subject to
mandatory arbitration; (2) each side will pay its own costs; and (3) the arbitration will take place in the city where the firm has its headquarters. Consumers who do not take the time to read the contract would have to infer
the dispute resolution terms in the agreement. Suppose that a consumer
believes that the contract contains a mandatory arbitration clause, that it
requires the consumer to pay the firm’s costs, and that the arbitration will
take place in the city where the consumer lives. In that case, the consumer is
correct about arbitration, pessimistic about costs, and optimistic about
venue.
What will a consumer with this set of beliefs do? We still do not know
because, to make a prediction, one needs to know the relative importance
that the consumer attaches to each of these provisions.24 If the consumer
places a significant value on the cost provision and not on the venue provision, the consumer will underestimate the value of the dispute resolution
provision. Alternatively, if the consumer places substantial weight on the
venue provision and not on the cost provision, the consumer will overestimate the value of the dispute resolution features of the contract. Finally, the
consumer could care roughly equally about the cost and venue provisions,
which would allow pessimism and optimism to more or less cancel each
other out.
This exercise suggests that the empirical challenges here are significant.
Some researchers have attempted to determine whether consumers are aware
of the content of agreements, although such researchers do not account for
the importance that consumers place on each contractual term.25 Their research shows, perhaps unsurprisingly, that consumers are correct about
some terms, optimistic about others, and pessimistic about the remainder.26

24. For a recent theoretical investigation of optimism and pessimism that includes some
preliminary data, see Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, Remedies for the No Read Problem in Consumer Contracting, 66 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://www.law.uchicago.
edu/files/files/Ayres%20paper.pdf. Ayres and Schwartz note that the presence of optimists creates two inefficiencies: (1) these optimists overpay for their contracts, and (2) the presence of
optimists leads sellers to lower the quality of contracts, which in turn creates a negative externality by forcing those with correct and pessimistic beliefs out of the market. Id. (manuscript
at 24).
25. See supra note 23 (discussing Bar-Gill’s review of these studies).
26. All-Indus. Research Advisory Council, Public Attitude Monitor 1989: A
Survey of Public Attitudes on Auto Insurance Rates, Seat Belts, Attorney Advertising, Homeowner’s Insurance, and Insurance Claim Fraud 13–15 (1989) (showing that a
majority of homeowners correctly believed that their insurance policies covered theft and vandalism but incorrectly assumed that their policies did not cover riots and did cover flood
damage).
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To be sure, estimating the welfare losses associated with reading costs is
also a difficult task.27 Doing so would require knowing how much consumers value contract terms of different quality and ascertaining how much it
would cost firms to supply those different terms. Estimating supply and demand curves is a difficult and data-intensive task.28 The task of doing this for
the class of transactions covered by form contracts would be daunting.
There is, however, some empirical evidence that supports the inference
that the reading-cost model is accurate. The Katz model predicts an equilibrium in which consumers will not read contracts and contracts will contain
terms that are adverse to consumers. The evidence developed by Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler and her coauthors suggests that reality is relatively close to
this equilibrium. In a study that uses click-stream data to ascertain whether
consumers who buy software online read the contracts that govern the sale,
the authors find that only “one or two out of every thousand” access the
contract and that consumers spend an average of less than a minute reading
the agreement.29 This finding is consistent with the Katz model’s prediction
that consumers will not read contracts.30
The work of Marotta-Wurgler also suggests that form agreements often
contain terms that are relatively low in quality.31 She samples software license agreements and assesses how their terms compare to seventeen of the
Article 2 Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) default rules. She finds that
the average agreement has about five terms that are worse than the default
rules.32 Of course, there is no way to know whether this is what the rational
27. It is also important to assess the accuracy of the assumptions in the Katz model. For
form contracts that are subject to significant publicity—such as the terms of service for
Facebook—there may be a sufficiently large number of people who read the contracts that
they can police their content. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 630 (1979) (arguing that an informed minority of readers can police the content of
agreements). This effect can cause the Katz model to unravel. Similarly, class actions may
police the content of fine print in a way that diminishes the welfare loss associated with form
contracts. See, e.g., Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 263–75 (Ill. 2006) (holding that a class action waiver in a cell phone contract’s arbitration clause was substantively
unconscionable and unenforceable).
28. E.g., C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, Estimating Supply and Demand in the World Oil Market, 34 J.
Energy & Dev. 1, 2 (2011) (describing the difficulties in producing satisfactory supply and
demand curves for the global oil market).
29. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the
Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 1 (NYU Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Org., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256.
30. See Katz, supra note 6, at 289.
31. E.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for
Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. Legal Stud. 309 (2009); Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 677 (2007) [hereinafter Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis].
32. Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 31, at 703.
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choice approach would predict. The Katz model suggests that firms will supply the lowest-quality terms that are legally permissible when consumers
have positive reading costs.33 It is hard to know what this means in many
cases because the contours of the doctrines that provide a floor for contract
terms, such as unconscionability34 and contracts against public policy,35 are
uncertain. Nevertheless, the finding that terms are worse than the defaults
provides evidence that is broadly consistent with the Katz model.
To be fair, however, the evidence that reading costs create larger
problems than misperception does is not unequivocal. Bar-Gill’s book
presents a theoretical basis for believing that firms make more money by
tailoring their contracts to those who are optimistic or irrational about contract terms. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that optimists will be
the ones who actually enter into contracts. Those who are, on balance, pessimistic about terms will place a lower value on contracts. Consequently, they
will not be willing to pay much and, all else equal, will be less likely to enter
into contracts.36 It is quite possible that this dynamic occurs and that it accounts for the losses that Bar-Gill attributes to it. But the empirical evidence
on this point amounts to surveys that can only show so much. The data
showing that people generally do not read contracts and that contract terms
are of low quality, in my view, makes a stronger case that reading costs
should be a priority. The book would have been strengthened had it engaged
that claim in a more direct way.
B. Regulating Complexity
Given my concern about reading costs, I have some skepticism that BarGill’s proposals for correcting optimism should be a regulatory priority. He
advocates thoughtful disclosure to mitigate the effects of consumer optimism (p. 34). What he has in mind are well-designed summaries that can
provide an easy-to-understand measure of the salient and nonsalient benefits and costs associated with the purchase of a consumer product (pp.
37–40). As an example, he points to total-benefit-of-ownership (“TBO”)
and total-cost-of-ownership (“TCO”) measures that companies could disclose to consumers before they purchase an agreement (p. 38).
An example that Bar-Gill identifies is the annual percentage rate
(“APR”) that the Truth in Lending Act requires companies to disclose to
consumers who enter into credit agreements such as mortgages and car
33. See Katz, supra note 6, at 288–89.
34. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2012); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1979); Oren
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 71 (2008) (“[The
unconscionability] doctrine gives courts broad power to strike down contract terms and entire
contracts that shock the conscience and are the product of a flawed bargaining procedure.”).
35. Cf. Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 483 (2010) (describing how the remedies for illegal contracts might take
into account the uncertain boundaries of contracts that are against public policy).
36. See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 24 (discussing the welfare problems associated with
optimistic consumers).
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loans (pp. 38–39). The APR purports to condense the various fees and
charges associated with consumer credit into a single, easy-to-understand
rate (p. 38). But as Bar-Gill recognizes, there “is broad consensus that the
APR has not lived up to its great potential” (p. 177). Among the failures of
the APR are its late disclosure, its imperfect enforcement, and especially its
underinclusiveness with respect to the fees and charges that lenders can impose (pp. 177–78). Consequently, Bar-Gill recommends improving these
condensed disclosures by having them incorporate all the various fees that
consumers may be charged (pp. 37–40).
A potential problem with these types of disclosures is that they leave
contractual complexity in the hands of the firms that supply the form contracts. This structure requires regulators to play an ongoing game of disclosure Whac-A-Mole. Once regulators have issued rules that purport to cover
the TBO or TCO for a given contract, firms can try to write their way
around these disclosures by devising new fees and charges that are outside
the coverage of the rules. Regulators can respond, but unless they are especially nimble and prescient, the control that firms have over the complexity
of their contracts may allow them to write around new rules.37
But even if regulators are able to keep up with firms’ attempts to evade
them, what matters most about disclosures is what consumers believe about
them. Imagine a consumer confronted with a long, fine-print contract that
is accompanied by a simple and brief disclosure that purports to summarize
the costs and benefits associated with the agreement. If the consumer believes that the disclosure completely summarizes the costs and benefits associated with the agreement, this type of disclosure may be effective at
neutralizing both the problems with overoptimism that concern Bar-Gill
and the problems with reading costs that I find more troubling.
If, however, the consumer remains suspicious about what the fine print
contains, the welfare losses associated with reading costs reappear. It is quite
possible that consumers will assume that, to understand all the costs and
benefits associated with the agreement, they need to read the agreement. The
need to sink the reading costs before learning the terms starts the cycle
anew. Firms may be able to offer the minimally acceptable contract, which
means that the consumer will not read the contract, and that will lead to an
inference that the terms are low quality. If regulation is to occur, it must, in
my view, target the reading costs that are the likely source of the largest
welfare losses.
What would a regulatory regime that targets reading costs look like? It is
important to recall that reading costs create an effect that is unfortunate
37. One alternative that may mitigate this concern—suggested by Bar-Gill in correspondence—would be to implement a standard that regulators could enforce against firms. The
book does not detail what these standards would look like or how enforcement would proceed.
Nevertheless, this approach may counter the ability of firms to use fine print to evade the aims
of disclosure to a greater degree than the proposals in the book. At the same time, standards
are generally more expensive to enforce than the rule-like regulations that Bar-Gill endorses,
and it is difficult to know whether the improved accuracy provided by standards would warrant this expense.
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from the standpoint of both consumers and firms. Even though there may
be high-quality terms that consumers would be willing to pay for and that
would still be profitable for firms, contracts do not contain them due to the
structural problems posed in the communication of those terms. It is possible that firms might be willing to bear the costs of communicating more
consumer-friendly terms. Indeed, one occasionally sees firms do this sort of
thing: Discover is currently promoting a credit agreement that forgives a late
payment by consumers, and Visa is publicizing a United-branded credit
card, offered through Chase, that eliminates the 3 percent surcharge on foreign transactions.38
But the practice of firms shouldering some of the costs of communication has its own problems. One difficulty is that it can be expensive to engage in this type of communication. Discover has developed a national
television advertising campaign to tout its late-payment forgiveness program. It may be that the costs exceed the gains of this sort of marketing,39
but a more pressing concern is the lingering presence of fine print. That a
contract contains one favorable term does not tell a consumer much about
what the rest of the contract says. Barring any compelling evidence to the
contrary, it makes sense for consumers to follow the logic that comes with
unknown terms that are costly to learn: consumers will assume that they are
unlikely to be of high quality.
Given these deep problems with reading costs, it is unsurprising that
scholars who have focused on reading costs have recommended stronger
medicine than disclosure. Katz, for example, suggests that the way to remedy
the situation is to impose standard terms that apply in the absence of express
negotiation.40 But, like many problems of contractual regulation, setting the
appropriate level of these terms poses empirical challenges. Because many
form contracts are likely to be governed by these terms, there is a particular
danger that setting the level too high will put firms in the position of either
ensuring that communication takes place or refusing to sell because the
terms are not profitable.
Of course, many proposals to regulate contracts go further than those of
Bar-Gill and Katz by recommending mandatory contract terms.41 These approaches are subject to a well-rehearsed set of critiques.42 Many of these
38. Credit Cards & Credit Card Applications, Discover, https://www.discover.com/creditcards/index.html?ICMPGN=STL_CC_IT (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (“No late fee on your first
late payment”); Chase United MileagePlus: Explorer Card, United, https://www.theexplorer
card.com/MPYoureIn30kAFW.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (“No foreign transaction fees”).
39. To be sure, Discover may have other aims, such as trying to create goodwill with
consumers with regard to its general practices.
40. Katz, supra note 6, at 276, 291.
41. Margaret Radin’s recent book, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the
Rule of Law, advocates mandatory prohibitions on arbitration and argues that similar prohibitions should be considered for the collection of personal information and for the use of intellectual property rights. See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate 172, 176, 183 (2013).
42. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale
L.J. 2032, 2084–86 (2012) (advocating for alternatives to mandatory terms); Alan Schwartz &
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criticisms hinge on the impediment that mandatory terms pose to the freedom of contract and the private ordering that this freedom permits. Nevertheless, the UCC does contain some mandatory terms, and some of them—
such as those that regulate warranties and those that prohibit the waiver of
product liability43—are not all that controversial. This may be a concession
to the reading-cost argument. Given the strong arguments in favor of placing basic product liability on the heads of producers, it must be a symptom
of a failure in the contracting process if those provisions do not appear in
consumer agreements. The reading-cost argument provides an account of
how this failure might occur.
Regulations that target reading costs do not, however, have to use
mandatory or implied terms. For example, Abraham Wickelgren proposes
that firms have the option to offer standardized form contracts, each of
which has a name.44 The names of these contracts need not be descriptive;
Wickelgren uses the example of contracts named after something as arbitrary as colors. A key to this approach is that firms may not deviate from the
terms of the designated contracts. Doing so would allow consumers to tell
whether firms are offering different types of contracts without having to
read them. As he points out, if there are two firms and they both offer the
blue contract, consumers can make their purchase decision on the basis of
price because they know that the contracts are the same; but if consumers
see a blue and an orange contract, they know that firms are offering different contracts.45 Wickelgren shows that if reading costs are sufficiently low,46
firms may be able to credibly commit to offering high-quality contracts to
those who desire them even though consumers do not actually end up reading the contracts.
Wickelgren’s solution is both clever and elegant. As he notes, however,
this equilibrium is not unique. Or to put it another way, there is no guarantee that the desirable equilibrium of firms offering high-quality contracts to
those who want them will actually occur because the equilibrium requires
that the necessary thresholds for reading costs and available contracts be
Robert E. Scott, Review, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 Yale L.J. 926, 930–31 (2010) (noting that mandatory terms undermine private ordering). Omri Ben-Shahar develops a new
critique of mandatory terms in his Review of Margaret Radin’s book. See Omri Ben-Shahar,
Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 883 (2014) (reviewing Radin,
supra note 41). He contends that mandatory terms prohibiting arbitration and cost shifting
may reflect the preferences of elites who are willing to pay higher prices for their favored
dispute resolution terms. This approach may work a regressive cross-subsidy in which the less
well-off consumers who are willing to live with these terms for lower prices must pay more to
indulge elite preferences. Id. at 900–01.
43. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (2012) (implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 2-715(2)(b)
(consequential damages include injury to person or property stemming from the seller’s
breach of warranty).
44. Wickelgren, supra note 6, at 32–33.
45. Id.
46. Wickelgren demonstrates that the threshold for reading costs that will induce some
consumers to read depends, among other things, on the quality of the best contract for those
consumers who desire high-quality terms. Id. at 37–41.
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met.47 As he also points out, it may not be straightforward to develop a
regime that punishes firms for labeling a contract as blue when it is not in
fact blue, and it is an open question as to who, exactly, would determine the
content of the labeled contracts.48
I would like to sketch out a counterintuitive approach that goes beyond
disclosure but that directly targets reading costs by making default rules
more attractive to sellers. Reading costs are a consequence of fine print, and
the need to write fine print is often due to the desire of the contract drafter
to deviate from the default rules provided by statute. With the UCC, the
default rules are quite consumer friendly, and, in some cases, it is difficult to
imagine why any firm would not deviate from what the UCC specifies. Examples here include the rules that provide consequential damages as a default and those that stipulate stronger warranties than many firms wish to
offer.49 These rules virtually guarantee the production of fine print and the
problems it entails.
If the default rules were more seller friendly, firms might be less eager to
contract around them. In a world where the default rules applied more
often, consumers might be more familiar with those rules. This situation
would allow consumers to know the content of a contract with minimal, or
perhaps zero, fine print.50 Consumers would just need to know the amount
of fine print an agreement contained, which they should be able to determine at very low cost.51 If there were no or very little fine print, consumers
could infer that the default rules applied. And if there were fine print, consumers could assume that it contained the bottom-of-the-barrel terms that
the Katz model predicts. As long as these seller-friendly terms are better than
the bottom of the barrel, consumers might be willing to pay higher prices to
the firms that offer them. If some contracts end up being fine-print free,
welfare would increase. This improvement would occur because consumers
would get some higher-quality contracts and firms would receive higher
prices for them. But even if no firms were willing to abandon the contractual flexibility that comes with fine print, the proposal would leave us where
47. Id.
48. Id. at 42–43.
49. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-715(2) (2012).
50. The assumption that consumers will be aware of default rules may not be correct.
While it is difficult to know the degree of consumer knowledge, there is, however, some evidence that consumers are aware of the default content of important rules, such as warranties.
See Yair Listokin, The Meaning of Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J. Legal Analysis
397, 399 (2010) (providing “suggestive” evidence that consumers value silent warranties at
about the same level as warranties that state the default UCC warranty).
51. Note that a very important caveat to this analysis is that the consumer must be aware
whether or not fine print accompanies the contract. The analysis in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
which held that a software license agreement located inside the product’s box was binding as
long as the consumer could read the terms and return the product, would be problematic. 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). At a minimum, for this approach to work, a consumer would need
to know whether or not fine print was present at the time of purchase.
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we are now. Or put another way, the downside would be no worse than the
status quo.
This approach would probably entail a substantial expansion of the content of the default rules. Common law contract doctrines and UCC rules are
so general that any firms that want coverage of concerns that are specific to
the goods or services they provide will need to use fine print.52 For this
proposal to be feasible, it would probably require default rules that are specific to certain goods and services. Examples might include a default cell
phone contract and a default rental car agreement. The expansion of the
number of default contracts naturally puts pressure on the assumption that
consumers will know the contracts’ terms. But if consumers can safely assume that fine-print-free contracts offer them better-than-the-bottom
terms, they might not need to know their precise content to be willing to pay
a little more. Moreover, certain terms, such as those involving dispute resolution, could be standardized across a large number of products.
Given this setup, the difficult question is how much more seller friendly
the default rules would have to be in order to make the proposal palatable to
both consumers and firms. As an initial matter, no one knows much about
consumer preferences for higher-quality contract terms. If the default dispute resolution clause provided for arbitration in a neutral forum with both
sides bearing their own costs, would consumers be willing to pay more for
that than for a strongly seller-biased arbitration clause? It is also hard to
know how firms might respond. Would some allow for a choice of contracts
with and without fine print? Or would most refuse to give up the control
and tailoring that comes with boilerplate? It would be an empirical challenge
to figure out these matters, but there is at least the prospect of improvement
over a world choked with low-quality boilerplate.
Considering default rules that are more seller friendly suggests a few
larger points. First, the traditional account of default rules has emphasized
the desirability of choosing rules favored by the majority of parties. In doing
so, policymakers can minimize the costs of contracting around them.53 But
the costs of poorly chosen default rules can go beyond contracting costs.
These rules generate fine print, which in turn increases reading costs. As
reading costs increase, the downward spiral that is possible in both the Katz

52. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607, 614 (2000) (“Article 2 drapes its framework of standards and rules over all
contexts where goods are sold. The starting point is the same whether the contract involves
natural gas, new cars, or factory equipment.”).
53. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (6th ed. 2011); Eric Maskin,
On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 557 (2006) (arguing that
default rules should be based on cost efficiency). But see Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and
Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 589, 589 (2006); Omri Ben-Shahar & John
A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651 (2006); Neil M.
Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 Geo. L.J. 689 (2013) (arguing that when default
rules implicate intellectual privacy concerns, the choice to share should be a conscious and
knowing one).
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and Wickelgren models becomes more likely. Consumers will not read contracts, and firms will respond with minimally tolerable provisions. But if
majoritarian default rules can avoid fine print, the costs of poorly chosen
defaults are larger than just the cost of contracting around them.
A second point relates to how contract interpretation rules can interact
with boilerplate. In the current context of consumer-friendly defaults,54 the
rule that ambiguous language will be construed against the drafter seems
questionable. The poor souls who generate boilerplate probably respond to
this threat by drafting more terms to cover more contingencies in more detail. This effect should increase the length of contracts, resulting in the nowfamiliar consequences associated with higher reading costs.55 But in the context of default rules that are more seller friendly, this rule might actually be
desirable. The goal of the proposal is to allow consumers to more easily
differentiate between higher-quality and lower-quality contracts. The length
of the contracts is one way to differentiate between these contracts: short or
nonexistent contracts contain the defaults, and longer contracts are highly
likely to opt out of the default rules in favor of lower-quality terms. Insofar
as this canon makes this differentiation easier, it has some attraction.
II. Myopia and Deferred Costs
While I think that a rational choice approach to contractual complexity
provides a more pervasive understanding than a behavioral approach, I find
Bar-Gill’s arguments about the prevalence of and problems associated with
consumer myopia quite compelling. Following a long philosophical and economic tradition, he argues that this behavioral flaw can cause consumer
preferences to change when the consumers must make decisions over time.56
Bar-Gill’s innovation here is to examine how firms can design contracts to
exploit these preference changes. Firms can do this by stacking benefits of a
contract at the beginning of the contract term and leaving the costs for
later.57
When consumers evaluate agreements with upfront benefits and deferred costs, they may be tempted by the benefits—such as a low introductory interest rate or a subsidized cell phone—while also believing that they
will not have to pay the later costs. They may, for example, expect that they
will switch credit cards when the higher interest rate kicks in or that they
will not go over the minute allotment in their cell phone plan. But they face
a similar calculus when the time comes to change cards or to refrain from
54. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1979). Courts often invoke this
rule in insurance disputes. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 653, 664 (2013) (“The maxim contra proferentem directs that ambiguities in a contract
be construed against its drafter. Nowhere is this maxim invoked more frequently than in insurance disputes, where the drafter is virtually always the insurer.” (footnotes omitted)).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 17–21.
56. See p. 21 (“Myopic consumers care more about the present and not enough about
the future.”).
57. See pp. 81–87 (explaining these effects in the context of credit cards).
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talking to a friend; the immediate benefit trumps the later cost of paying a
higher interest rate or an overage charge.
One might consider this myopia a flaw because it results from consumers discounting the future at different rates. Conventional definitions of rationality require a constant discount rate to keep preferences stable. There is
a fair amount of evidence that people do not discount the future in this
way.58 For example, if someone who prefers $4 today to $5 tomorrow has a
constant discount rate, that person should also prefer $4 in 99 days to $5 in
100 days. But a myopic consumer may prefer $4 today to $5 tomorrow and
$5 in 100 days over $4 in 99 days. This is a preference flip because the consumer does not value a difference of a dollar over 24 hours in the same way
at different points in time. The consumer has a higher discount rate for the
immediate future when compared to the consumer’s discount rate for events
that are further off.
Bar-Gill cleverly shows how a firm that faces a market of myopic consumers can exploit this flaw. By providing benefits of a contract immediately
or shortly after signing, firms may encounter consumers who discount any
future costs quite steeply.59 Imagine, for example, a consumer who expects
to run up a balance on a credit card in six months. If a firm offered frequent-flier miles that it would give after six months of use and an interest
rate of 10 percent, the consumer would discount these benefits and costs at
roughly the same rate. This may lead the consumer to decline the offer. But
if the contract offered the benefit of frequent-flier miles right away, the consumer would apply the steep discount only to the costs six months down the
line. This structure may induce the consumer to accept the bargain. It is
arguably undesirable for the consumer to do so because the consumer might
overconsume credit by making this choice.
Bar-Gill also identifies how per-use fees, such as credit card late-payment charges and cell phone overages, may be an especially effective way to
appeal to myopic consumers.60 At the outset of a contract, consumers may
believe that they will only make occasional use of late fees because the benefits of deferred payment or of talking to a friend, as well as the extra fees
these actions entail, are all far off in the future. But when the time comes to
decide whether to put off payment or to call that friend, the benefits are now
immediate and the cost is still delayed. Consumers may overuse these features because they discount the immediate future quite steeply.
As with optimism, Bar-Gill acknowledges that not all consumers are
subject to myopia. This observation naturally leads one to question how
pervasive the problem is, and Bar-Gill has a strong response. In the chapter
58. P. 156; George Ainslie, Derivation of “Rational” Economic Behavior from Hyperbolic
Discount Curves, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 334 (1991); Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. Econ. Literature 351 (2002).
59. Pp. 53–54 (credit cards); p. 156 (mortgages); p. 185 (cell phones).
60. P. 49 (noting that consumers mistakenly believe that there will never be a benefit
from making a late payment); p. 186 (noting that consumers underestimate the chance of
incurring overages).
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discussing cell phones, Bar-Gill explains a data set that he and Rebecca Stone
developed. Using the data set, he makes a convincing case that consumers
often fail to choose the plan that best corresponds to their actual usage (p.
219). For all the plans that Bar-Gill and Stone study, at least a quarter of the
consumers choose plans that have cheap initial fees but end up costing more
than other plans due to the overage fees that these consumers incur (p. 220).
Had they picked a more expensive base plan, the transaction would end up
costing them less in the long run because they would presumably not have
to pay as much in overage fees. This evidence helps show that at least some
percentage of people may be paying for the myopia in a way that deviates
from what a rational actor model would predict.
The more difficult question is, what should be done about this myopia?
Scholars writing about steep discounting of the immediate future have tied
the problem to weakness of the will. Indeed, it is hard to find a discussion of
myopia that does not mention the story of Ulysses and the Sirens.61 When
the Sirens are far off and the lure of their enchanting songs is not immediate,
Ulysses knows that the costs are greater than the benefits. But he also knows
that when those benefits become immediate and the costs are still far off, he
will succumb to temptation. Accordingly, he recommends a rather extreme
measure to prevent the harm that the weakness of his will might cause. He
instructs his men to strap him to the ship’s mast and not release him under
any circumstances.
Bar-Gill does not endorse this sort of strong remedy. Rather, he adheres
to disclosure as the most desirable means to remedy consumer myopia (p.
4). There are defensible grounds for taking this position. This light-touch
regulation preserves much of the private ordering that makes contracting a
socially valuable institution.62 This approach is also consistent with efforts to
“nudge” people into making decisions that will make them better off without invoking heavy-handed paternalism.63
I am particularly skeptical, however, that disclosure—and even the
nuanced and intelligent disclosure that Bar-Gill recommends—will be an
effective guard against myopia. Ulysses asks his men to take away his agency
to prevent him from succumbing to the Sirens. Precommitment strategies of
this type abound—common examples include Christmas Club savings
schemes and heavy penalties on early withdrawal of 401K accounts64—but
61. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (rev. ed. 1984); Nava Ashraf et al., Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a
Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines, 121 Q.J. Econ. 635 (2006).
62. As Bar-Gill acknowledges, disclosure does not completely eliminate paternalism. Disclosure will inevitably reflect the priorities of legislators, and the features that get disclosed can
alter markets because firms compete over the disclosed features. Pp. 42–43.
63. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Welfare, and Happiness (rev. & expanded ed., Penguin Books 2009) (2008); Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1159 (2003).
64. A Christmas Club is a special savings account at a bank where the customer deposits
money throughout the year. The account rules either forbid or penalize the withdrawal of
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they generally require restrictions that go beyond disclosure. As Jon Elster
identifies, to counteract myopia, one needs to alter the magnitude of the
costs and benefits that come with decisions or change the timing associated
with these costs and benefits.65 Improved disclosure does not have these
effects.66
Bar-Gill rightly points out that firms themselves are unlikely to offer
much to minimize the costs associated with myopia (pp. 30–32). Cell phone
companies could, for example, disallow nonemergency calls once consumers
reach their monthly quota. Credit card companies could, similarly, restrict
purchases once teaser rates expire. But firms have little incentive to take
these measures. They make more money when they can charge higher rates,
and, as long as they do not lose many customers by catering to myopia, they
should not be expected to provide myopia-limiting products.
Regulatory solutions that alter the cost structure associated with myopic
choices are, however, more controversial. One aggressive technique is an
outright prohibition on certain types of contract terms. Many states have
laws that restrict the interest rates that creditors can charge, and the Credit
CARD Act of 2009 prohibits practices such as the use of double-cycle billing.67 As Paul Heidhues and Botond Köszegi show, when some consumers
have a preference for immediate gratification, these types of prohibitions can
increase welfare.68 The regulation they analyze would prohibit terms that
impose large penalties for deferring small amounts of payments.69 They argue that these sorts of restrictions are likely to be palatable because they
benefit the unsophisticated consumers—those who overborrow and must

money prior to the holiday season. See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to
It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1759 (2003)
(“People who want to force themselves to save can join a Christmas Club, which will be deaf to
any demands for withdrawal of the funds before December 15.”); Jolls et al., supra note 2, at
1479 (discussing bonded willpower regarding pension plans).
65. Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and
Constraints 29–31 (2000).
66. To be fair, Bar-Gill’s claim is that providing improved disclosure may allow people to
act more like Ulysses. If that supposition is correct, disclosure may be preferable to the
stronger rules, such as those prohibiting terms that exploit myopia, because disclosure allows
for more private ordering. But the degree to which disclosure will have this effect is not
known, and the book could do more to substantiate this claim. This is especially so in light of
evidence that people engage in a lot of activities that have short-term benefits and long-term
costs—such as smoking and bad eating habits—even though the long-term costs of these
activities are well known.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 86 (2012) (imposing a penalty for taking usurious interest); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1637(j)(1) (2012) (prohibiting double-cycle billing).
68. Paul Heidhues & Botond Köszegi, Exploiting Naı̈vete About Self-Control in the Credit
Market, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 2279, 2285–86 (2010) (explaining restrictions that can be welfare
enhancing).
69. More specifically, they endorse a restriction that prohibits later interest rates from
increasing in a convex way as opposed to, say, in a linear way. Id. at 2290–91.
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pay these penalties—and have no effect on sophisticated consumers who
would not have to pay these penalties in any event.70
But any restriction on terms needs to be done cautiously. There are
potentially welfare-enhancing reasons why firms might want to offer low
introductory rates that increase substantially after a set period of time. For
example, if there are switching costs associated with moving from one credit
card to another or from one cell phone service provider to another, firms
may need to compensate consumers for the inconvenience associated with
these switches.71 Offering an initially low interest rate or subsidizing the upfront cost of a cell phone is an important way that firms can help offset the
costs of switching.72
A prohibition on the ability of firms to tantalize consumers with low
introductory offers may harm the welfare of rational, nonmyopic consumers. These consumers may be unwilling to switch unless they receive some
sort of compensation from their new provider. Regulation that bans this
practice can hinder competition, much in the same way that Bar-Gill worries that behavioral biases may limit competition (pp. 24–25). Knowing
whether and how to regulate a consumer market that includes sophisticated
and nonsophisticated consumers poses difficulties. As I have highlighted
elsewhere in this Review, gathering the correct data is likely to be a demanding task that will not always yield clear answers. Indeed, Alan Schwartz argues that whether rationality or myopia dominates a market can be hard to
determine.73
The difficulty of ascertaining whether regulation is likely to increase
consumers’ welfare may be part of what makes intervention such a contested
issue. When it comes to myopia, there are theoretical reasons to believe that
it leads to harmful overconsumption. But the cure may be worse than the
disease, and obtaining an adequate diagnosis is likely to be very difficult.
What is the better policy choice in this circumstance? As I have articulated
here, and others have explained elsewhere, disclosure may not change much

70. Id. Their analysis puts aside the potential for strategic interactions between firms. As
below, the potential for competition between customers may provide a very good reason for
firms to subsidize switching costs.
71. Guy Arie & Paul L.E. Grieco, Who Pays for Switching Consumers?, Pa. State Dep’t of
Econ. 1 (Oct. 2013), http://www.econ.psu.edu/~plg15/Switching_Oct2013.pdf (“[For the customers of competing firms, switching costs] are like a tax and the firm’s short-term incentive
is to set a lower price that partially compensates the cost of switching.”).
72. The size of switching costs can be difficult to measure. With respect to credit cards,
Bar-Gill suggests that robust competition at the issuing level may mean that switching costs
are low, but he counters that “psychological switching costs and simple inertia” may restrict
actual switches. Pp. 64–65.
73. See Alan Schwartz, The Rationality Assumption in Consumer Protection Law, Ctr. for
Law & Econ. (Mar. 2013), http://www.lawecon.ethz.ch/education/lawecon/education/lawecon/
readings/consumer_regulation.pdf.

April 2014]

Rationality’s Reach

1013

actual behavior.74 I find it much more appealing to target the low-hanging
fruit with forceful prohibitions.75
The double-cycle billing prohibited by the CARD Act is a nice illustration of this low-hanging fruit.76 This practice can increase the size of credit
card balances for consumers who vary their balance substantially over the
course of time.77 Double-cycle billing has several hallmarks of a problematic
practice: It is complex and thus likely to be buried in fine print that consumers neither read nor comprehend. It has the potential to reduce the welfare
of myopic consumers because those who find themselves carrying larger balances than they expected will have to make higher interest payments. And,
finally, it is difficult to imagine how this practice could benefit more rational
consumers. It does not, for example, compensate them for switching from
one credit card to another. When a practice has these characteristics, it
strikes me as a relatively easy case to adopt a prohibition against it.
But a lot of practices that potentially implicate myopia are hard cases.
Do we have to ban the pervasive practice of offering no payments for the
first few months of a credit purchase? A behaviorist might see these marketing techniques as a temptation to overconsume, while a pure rationalist
might see them as an attempt to induce an informed switch. For those of us
who are skeptical of what disclosure can accomplish, how do we know what
to do when theory can justify both intervention and the free market status
quo? I suspect that, for some, the answer has more to do with their prior
views about the desirability of regulation. This lack of clear answers suggests
that, when it comes to consumer protection, perhaps the most pressing need
is for data that can discern whether rationality or myopia predominates.
Conclusion
In much of Seduction by Contract, Bar-Gill shows how best to combat
the orthodox model of economic rationality. He discusses evidence of how
people may deviate from the rational actor model, he builds a theory of how
74. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, Failure of Mandated Disclosure, supra note 4, at 665; Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. Institutional & Theoretical
Econ. 94, 111 (2012) (“But even if sellers are constrained by reputation, it remains the case
that mandating contract disclosure will not change consumer behavior.”). Note, however, that
the disclosure Marotta-Wurgler examines is disclosure of the terms rather than the targeted
disclosure that Bar-Gill advocates.
75. Support for this intuition comes from a recent analysis of the impact of the CARD
Act. Agarwal et al. analyze the effects of both the hard restrictions on fees required by the
CARD Act and the softer regulations, such as those that require disclosure of the interest rate
savings associated with paying off a balance in thirty-six months rather than making minimum payments. The authors find that the fee restrictions produced $20.8 billion in savings for
consumers while the interest rate disclosure saved only $71 million. See Sumit Agarwal et al.,
Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards, Soc. Sci. Research Network 4–5 (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330942.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(j)(1) (2012) (prohibiting double-cycle billing).
77. See Mary Beth Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009—What Is It, and What Does
It Do?, 2010 Ark. L. Notes 65, 68–69.
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firms might exploit the model’s flaws, he analyzes whether a rational model
can account for observed behavior, and he proposes a regulatory regime
tailored to the problems he identifies. The critiques in this Review focus only
on the last two steps. Bar-Gill’s framework for contractual complexity would
be more persuasive if it wrestled with the leading rational choice models of
contract comprehension. Doing so would not inherently undermine his arguments—indeed, it may even allow for a unified framework of consumer
misperception and reading costs. But engaging these claims would almost
certainly make his arguments more convincing to committed rationalists.
As for his proposals to remedy the ills he identifies through disclosure, I
share the skepticism of others. If reading costs lead consumers to believe that
contract terms will be of low quality, disclosing what they already believe
may have limited effect. Moreover, if disclosure still allows firms to wield
fine print, regulators will need to be particularly deft to keep up the fight.
Perhaps this is within their power, but Bar-Gill’s book does not detail how
and why regulators might be able to do so. A similar critique applies to BarGill’s advocacy of disclosure to remedy consumer myopia. Under a standard
model of weakness of the will, some form of precommitment is often necessary to prevent succumbing to temptation. While disclosure might nudge
people into making better decisions, stronger tonics might be more effective
cures for myopia. Both rationalists and behaviorists would benefit from conducting these sorts of relative inquiries in the future.

